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The present rules on export subsidies and  desirable to strengthen existing rules on domes-
domestic subsidies should be revised to conform  tic subsidies. This could be accomplished by
better to economic principles and to limit  prohibiting domestic subsidies that exceed a
distortions in intemational trade. To begin with,  certain percentage of output value as well as
the illustrative list of export subsidies should be  domestic subsidies provided in cases where
made definitive, with appropriate revisions.  exports account for a large proportion of output.
These revisions would eliminate the dual pricing
of inputs and remove requirements of the  Developing countries receive preferential
physical incorporation of inputs for the exemp-  treatment in the application of GATT rules on
tion and remission of indirect taxes and import  export subsidies. They are exhorted, however,
charges.  Also, the exception made for primary  to reduce or eliminate export subsidies which are
products in regard to the prohibition of export  inconsistent with their competitive or develop-
subsidies should be eliminated.  ment needs.  It is suggested that procedures be
established to phase out export subsidies in the
Only measures which are specific to an en-  case of advanced developing countries as well as
terprise or industry should be considered domes-  in cases when an industry of a developing
tic subsidies. At the same time, it would be  country is intemationally competitive.
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draft.SUBSIDIES  AND  COUNTERVAILING  MEASURES: ECONOMIC  CONSIDERATIONS
Bela  Balassa
This  paper  will  examine  issues  relating  to subsidies  and
countervailing  measures  and  make  recommendations  for  changes  in  existing  rules
on the  basis  of  economic  considerations.  This  will  be done  by analyzing,
successively,  the  concepts  of subsidies  (Section  I),  countervailing  measures
and serious  prejudice,  nullification  or impairment  (Section  II),  and  the
special  treatment  of  developing  countries  (Section  III).
I-  Concepts  of Subsidies
Economic  Effects  of Export  Subsidies
There  i8  a basic  assymetry  in  GATT. While  import  tariffs  are
accepted  under  GATT  rules,  export  subsidies  are  prohibited,  with  exception
made for  the  subsidization  of primary  exports  and  subsidies  by the  developing
countries. Yet,  import  protection  and  export  subsidies  are  symmetrical  in
their  economic  effects: they  favor  production  in the  country  imposing  such
measures  at the  expense  of  production  in  other  countries  for  foreign  or for
domestic  markets;  in so  doing,  they  introduce  distortions  in international
trade.
A solution  to this  puzzle  may  lie  in  the  emphasis  on incremental
measures,  on the  assumption  that  the  point  of departure  is  a set  of "bound"
tariffs  and  no export  subsidies.  Now,  GATT  pros%;ribes  increases  in  tariffs
from  their  bound  level  as  well  as the  imposition  of export  subsidies.  Under
this  interpretation,  the  rules  aim  at  avoiding  additional  distortions  in
international  trade,  whether  in  the  form  of increases  in import  tariffs  or the
imposition  of export  subsidies.- 2  -
An alternative  explanation  is thas  countries  react  differently  to
measures  applied  in  foreign  markets  and  to  measures  that  affect  their  domestic
markets. They  consider  foreign  trade  barriers  as reflecting  the  economic
sovereignty  of the  countries  concerned,  while  they  regard  foreign  export
subsidies  as interfering  with their  own  economic  sovereignty.
An additional  consideration  is that  export  subsidies  affect  third
country  markets  in  distorting  the  conditions  of  competition  among  foreign
exporters  in these  markets. In so  doing,  they  interfere  with  international
specializa-ion  according  to comparative  advantage. A case  in point  is the
agricultural  subsidies  provided  by  high-cost  producers  that  limit  the  export
possibilities  of low-cost  producers.
In the  following,  we will  review  existing  GATT  rules  on export
subsidies  on the  basis  of economic  considerations.  The scope  of the
discussion  will  further  be  extended  to  encompass  domestic  subsidies.
Export  Subsidies  on Products  other  than  Primary  Products
According  to  the  General  Agreement,  "contracting  parties  shall  cease
to grant  either  directly  or indirectly  any  form  of subsidy  on the  export  of
any  product  other  than  a primary  product  which  subsidy  results  in  the  sale  of
such  product  for  export  at  a price  lower  than  the  comparable  price  charged  for
the  like  product  to  buyers  in  the  domestic  market"  (XVI:4). This  prohibition,
applying  to developed  countries  that  signee  the  1960  Declaration  on  Article
XVI:4,  was  reaffirmed  in the  Tokyo  Round  Code  on  Subsides and  Countervailing
Duties  promulgated  under  the  title  "Agreement  on Interpretation  and
Application  of  Articles  VI,  XVI,  and  XXIII  of the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs
and  Trade."-3-
But  the  Code  eschews  any  reference  to  the  dual  pricing  rule  in simply
stating  that  "signatories  shall  not  grant  export  subsidies  on products  other
than  certain  primary  products"  (9:1). This  can  be considered  an improvement
since  subsidization  does  not  necessarily  lead  to lower  export  than  domestic
prices. Such  may be the  case,  for  example,  if  subsidization  takes  the  form  of
preferential  export  credits,  guarantees,  and insurance,  or if exporters  take
higher  profits.
At the  same  time,  the  Code  refers  to the  practices  listed  in the
Annex,  which  "are  illustrative  of export  subsidies"  (9:2). Thus,  we do not
have  a definitive  list  of export  subsidies  but  only  an illustrative  list.
This  fact  creates  uncertainty  in  the  application  of the  GATT  rules.
Uncertainty  could  be reduced  if  the  Contracting  Parties  to  the
General  Agreement  adopted  the  illustrative  list  as definitive,  following
appropriate  revisions. Contracting  parties  would,  then,  have  the
responsibility  not  to grant  the  export  subsidies  listed,  with  exception  made
for  primary  products  and  for  developing  countries.
The list  includes  ten  specific  items  as well  as a  general  category,
which  covers  "any  other  charge  on the  public  account  constituting  an  export
subsidy  in the  sense  of  Article  XVI  of the  General  Agreement."  The  last  point
leads  to the  question  if  budgetary  cost (a  charge  on public  account)  should  be
considered  a necessary  condition  for  there  being  an export  subsidy.
Such  is  not  necessarily  the  case  for  item  (b),  under  which  "internal
transport  and  freight  charges  on  export  shipments,  provided  or  mandated  by
governments,  on terms  more  favorable  than  for  domestic  shipments"  is
considered  an export  subsidy. Also,  in item  (d)  reference  is  made  to actions
by government  agencies,  whose  budget  may  not  be integrated  with that  of the- 4 -
government.  Finally,  export  credits  may  be provided  by "special  institutions
controlled  by and/or  acting  under  the  authority  of  governments"  (item  k)
without  there  being  a budgetary  cost. For  example,  banks  providing  export
credit  may be subject  to lower  reserve  requirements.
It  would  appear,  then,  that  there  being  a  budgetary  cost  is  not
necessarily  a condition  for  an export  subsidy. At the  same  time,  several
items  on the  subsidy  list  may  be reconsidered.
Item  (d)  concerns  "the  delivery  by governments  or their  agencies  of
imported  or domestic  products  or services  for  use  in the  production  of
exported  goods,  on terms  or  conditions  more  favorable  than  for  delivery  of
like  or directly  competitive  products  or services  for  use  in the  production  of
goods  for  domestic  consumption,  if (in  the  case  of products)  sucl  terms  or
conditions  are  more favorable  than  those  commercially  available  on  world
markets  to their  exporters."  This item  permits  dual  pricing  for  inputs:
charging  lower  prices  for  inputs  used  in  production  for  the  export  market  than
for  the  same  inputs  used in  production  for  the  domestic  market  is  permissible
as long  as these  prices  are  not  below  world  market  prices. Such  dual  pricing
should-be  considered  a subsidy  to  exports,  which  are  favored  over  domestic
production.
Further  questions  arise  in  regard  to item  (h),  which  permits
eremption,  remission,  or  deferral  of indirect  taxes  on  goods  and  services  used
in  export  production  if "the  prior  stage  cumulative  indirect  taxes  are levied
on goods  that  are  physically  incorporated  (making  normal  allowance  for  waste)
in  the  exported  products." The  same  condition  appears  in item  (i)  that
relates  to the  remission  or drawback  of import  charges.- 5  -
These  clauses  exclude  indirect  taxes  and  import  charges  on services,
such  as transportation  and  communication,  as well  as on  machinery,  and  on
fuels  and  electricity  used  to  opzrate  machinery,  which  are  not  physically
incorporated  in the  product  Such  a  distinction  does  not  have  an economic
rationale,  and  the  rules  on indirect  taxes  and import  charges  should  be
applicable  to all  inputs. In the  case  of machinery,  this  would  involve  a pro
rata  charge  of indirect  taxes  or import  charges  on the  exported  products.
The  question  has  been  raised,  however,  if one  should  accept  the
rebating  of indirect  taxes  when  the  rebating  of direct  taxes  is considered  an
export  subsidy. This  pruvision  may  be rationalized  on the  grounds  that
rebating  an indirect  tax  assures  the  equality  of prices  received  by the
producer  for  domestic  and  for  export  sales,  when  the  domestic  consumer  price
will  equal  the  sum  of the  producer  price  and  the  indirect  tax.  In turn,
rebating  the income  tax  would  reduce  the  export  price  below  that  for  domestic
sales.
Export  Subsidies  on Primary  Products
As noted  earlier,  the  General  Agreement  permits  subsidies  to exports
of primary  products. In this  connection,  the  question  arises  what  is  meant  by
a primary  product.
In  the  Note  to  Article  XVI,  it is  stated  that  "a 'primary  product'  is
understood  to be  any  product  of farm,  forest,  or fishery,  or any  mineral,  in
its  natural  form  or which  has  undergone  only  such  processing  as is  customarily
required  to prepare  it  for  marketing  in  substantial  volume  in international
trade." This  statement  clarifies  the  situation: for  example,  wheat  is  a
primary  product,  but  pasta  is  not. The  reference  to "marketing  in substantial-6-
volume  in international  trade"  also  means  that  meat (together  with  livestock)
may  be regarded  as a primary  product.
Article  XVI:3  states  that  "contracting  parties  should  seek  to avoid
the  use  of subsidies  on the  export  of primary  products." There  is  no
obligation,  however,  to refrain  from  the  use  of  export  subsidies  except  that
the  General  Agreement  seeks  to  limit  subsidization  in the  following  case:
"If,  however,  a contracting  party  grants  directly  or indirectly  any
form  of subsidy  which  operates  to increase  the  export  of any  primary
product  from  its  territory,  such  subsidy  shall  not  be  applied  in  a
manner  which  results  in  that  contracting  party  having  more  than  an
equitable  share  of  world  export  trade  in that  product,  account  being
taken  of the  shares  of the  contracting  parties  in such  trade  in  the
product  during  a previous  representative  period,  and  any special
factors  which  may  have  affected  or may  be affecting  such  trade  in the
prr-uct  (XVI:2)."
This  provision  has  little  practical  value  as it  does  not  define  the
meaning  of "equitable  share"  beyond  reference  to  export  market  shares  during  a
previous  representative  period,  which  is subject  to  diverse  interpretation.
The  introduction  of "special  factors  which  may  have  affected  or  may  be
affecting  such  trade  in  the  product"  further  adds  to  uncertainty.
The  Code  attempted  to  introduce  greater  precision  in the  definition
in stating  that  "'more  than  equitable  share  of world  export  trade'  shall
include  any  case  in  which  the  effect  of  an export  subsidy  granted  by a
signatory  is  to displace  the  exports  of  another  signatory  bearing  in  mind the
developments  on  world  markets"  and  "'a  previous  representative  period'  shall
normally  be the  three  most  recent  calendar  years  in  which  normal  market
conditions  existed"  (10:2).
It is  not  clear,  however,  what  the  reference  to the  most  recent
calendar  years  means  in  cases  of  export  subsidies  for  primary  products  that
have  been  used  for  some  time.  Further  questions  arise  in  connection  with-7-
Article  10:3  in  the  Code,  under  which  "signatories  further  agree  not  to grant
export  subsidies  on  exports  of certain  primary  products  to  a particular  market
in  a manner  which  results  in  prices  materially  below  those  of  other  suppliers
to the  same  market." This  provision  covers  only  the  case  when there  is
substantial  underpricing,  yet  export  subsidization  in  primary  products
generally  aims to  offset  differences  in  production  costs  without  necessarily
undercutting  substantially  the  prices  charged  by low-cost  producers.
Nor can  refinements  of these  provisions  suffice. Rather,  one  should
aim  at eliminating  export  subsidies  to  primary  products. There  is  no economic
rationale  for  the  special  treatment  of such  products;  the  same  rules  should
apply  to all. This  is  not  to say  that  subsidies  to primary  products  could  be
eliminated  immediately.  But,  the  Contracting  Parties  should  take  a commitment
as to their  elimination  over  time,  and  establish  a timetable  for  the
implementation  of this  agreement.
Domestic  Subsidies
While  the  General  Agreement  prohibits  export  subsidies,  except  for
primary  exports  and  for  developing  countries,  there  is  no such  prohibition  of
domestic  subsidies.  At the  same  time,  "in  any  case  in  which  it is  determined
that  serious  prejudice  to  the  interest  of any  contracting  party  is caused  or
threatened  by  any  such  subsidization,  the  contracting  party  granting  the
subsidy  shall,  upon  request,  discuss  with  the  other  contracting  party  or
parties  concerned,  or  with  the  Contracting  Parties,  the  possibility  of
limiting  the  subsidization"  (GATT,  XVI:1). This  clause  has  rarely  been  used,
but  domestic  subsidies  have  been  countervailed.
While  Article  XVI  of the  General  Agreement  does  not  define  domestic
subsidies,  the  Code  states: "Examples  of possible  forms  of such  subsidies- 8 -
are: government  financing  of commercial  enterprises,  including  grants,  loans,
or  guarantees;  government  provision  or  government  financed  provision  of
utility,  supply  distribution  and  other  operational  or support  services  or
facilities;  government  financing  of research  ond  development  programmes;
fiscal  incentives;  and  government  subscription  to,  or provision  of,  equity
capital"  (11:2)
It is  further  added: "Signatories  note  that  the  above  form  of
subsidies  are  normally  granted  either  regionally  or  by sector. The
enumeration  of forms  of subsidies  set  out  above  is illustrative  an-  n-
exhaustive,  and  reflects  these  currently  granted  by  a number  of signatories  to
this  Agreement"  (11:2).
In fact,  the  list  is far  from  exhaustive  as it  does  not  cover  special
credit  terms  provided  by banks  on the  government's  behest  or preferential
transport  charges,  for  example. At the  same  time,  questions  have  been  raised
about  the  specificity  of a domestic  subsidy.
The  Group  of  Experts  on the  Calculation  of the  Amount  of  a Subsidy
has submitted  Draft  Guidelines  for  the  Application  of the  Concept  of
Specificity  in  the  Calculation  of the  Amount  of a Subsidy  other  than  an Export
Subsidy  (SCM/W/89,  April  25,  1985)  to the  Committee  on Subsidies  and
Countervailing  Measures. Under  the  Guidelines,  only  measures  which  are
specific  to  an enterprise  or industry  or  group  of enterprises  or industries
are  considered  domestic  subsidies  from  the  point  of  view  of the  application  of
Article  XVI of  the  Agreement.
This  provision  may  be  considered  appropriate  since  generally
applicable  subsidies  do not  favor  particular  enterprises  or industries,  but
apply  across  the  board. For  example,  a  government  may introduce  incentives  topromote  investment  that  are  available  to  any  investor  regardless  of the
industry.
At the  same  time,  the  Guidelines  state  that  "it  remains  for  the
signatories  to  address  the  issue  of regional  specificity."  In this
connection,  it  has  been  argued  that  regional  subsidies  to particular
enterprises  or industries  should  be  admitted  as they  aim  at remedying  the  cost
disabilities  of particular  regions.
This  arwument  fails  to consider  that  regional  subsidies  to  particular
enterprises  or industries  distort  comparative  advantage  in  the  industries  in
question. Thus,  on the  regional  level,  too,  distinction  needs  to  be made
between  general  and  specific  subsidies.  General  subsidies,  which  aim  at
offsetting  the  overall  cost  disabilities  of a region,  should  not  be considered
domestic  subsidies  from  the  point  of  view  of the  application  of Article  XVI
while  specific  subsidies  should  be so  considered.
Article  XVI:l  of the  General  Agreement  refers  to indirect  as  well  as
to  direct  subsidies. Indirect  subsidies  may  be  provided  to inputs  that  are
used in  products  which  enter  international  trade. In this  case  the
specificity  test  should  apply  to the  final  product;  i.e.  one should  inquire  if
the  subsidized  input  is specific  to the  final  product. Thus,  the  existence  of
subsidization  presumes  that  the  input  producing  enterprise  or industry
receives  a subsidy  and  th t  the  input  is specific  to the  product  concerned.
A related  issue  is  the  pricing  of natural  resources. Governments  may
set  a lower  price  for  natural  resources  used  domestically  than  sold
internationally,  thereby  bestowing  an advantage  on domestic  industry  utilizing
the  natural  resource. And, subsidies  to  natural  resources  in  general  may
provide  an advantage  to industries  using  these  resources  in  their  export  as- 10  -
well  as  domestic  sales. Finally,  government  ownership  of  natural  resov:rces
may  lead  to  discriminatory  treatment.
These  practices  should  be evaluated  on the  basis  of the  described
principles  on indirect  subsidization.  This  would  mean  judging  them  on the
basis  of subsidization  of the  input  concerned  and  its  specificity  to the  user
industry.
II.  Countervailing  Measures,  Serious  Prejudice  and
Nullification  or Impairment
According  to  the  General  Agreement,  "the  term 'countervailing  duty'
shall  be understood  to  mean  a special  duty  levied  for  the  purpose  of
offsetting  any  bounty  or subsidy  bestowed,  directly  or indirectly,  upon  the
manufacture,  production  or export  of  merchandise"  (VI:3). At the  same  time,
the  condition  for  levying  a countervailing  duty  is that  the  subsidy  "causes  or
threatens  material  injury  to  an established  industry  in  the  territory  of a
contracting  party  or  materially  retards  the  establishment  of a  domestic
industry"  (VI:1). It is further  added  that  "no  countervailing  duty shall  be
levied  on any  product  of the  territory  of any  contracting  party  imported  into
the  territory  of another  contracting  party  in  excess  of an amount  equal  to the
estimated  bounty  or subsidy  determined  to  have  been  granted,  directly  or
indirectly,  on the  manufacture,  production,  or export  of such  product  in  the
country  of origin  or exportation,  including  any  special  subsidy  to  the
transportation  of a particular  product"  (VI:3).
It  is  apparent  that  export  subsidies  as  well  as domestic  subsidies
can  be  countervailed.  However,  the  amount  of countervailing  duty  is  limited
to  the  subsidy  bestowed  on  products  imported  into  the  country  taking
countervailing  action,  thus  excluding  subsidies  that  benefit  exports  to third- 11 -
countries  or domestic  sales  although  these,  too,  can  cause  or threaten
material  injury  to the  industry  of the  country  concerned.
Thus,  countervailing  action  is  not  available  in the  case  when  a
foreign  subsidy  adversely  affects  a country's  sales  to third  markets  or to the
markets  of the  country  imposing  a subsidy. In  these  cases,  Articles  XVI or
XXIII  may  apply. The former  states  that  "In  any  case  in  which  it  is
determined  that  serious  prejudice  to  the  interest  of any  other  contracting
party  is  caused  or threatened  by  any  such  subsidization,  the  contracting  party
granting  the  subsidy  shall,  upon  request,  discuss  with the  other  contracting
party  or  parties  concerned,  or  with  the  Contracting  Parties,  the  possibility
of limiting  the  subsidization"  (XVI:1). The  latter  deals  with  nullification
or impairment  and  states: "If  any  contracting  party  should  consider  that  any
benefit  accruing  to it  directly  or indirectly  under  this  Agreement  is  being
nullified  or impaired  or that  the  attainment  of any  objective  of the  Agreement
is  being  impeded  ...  the  contracting  party  may,  with  a view  to the
satisfactory  adjustment  of the  matter,  make  written  representations  or
proposals  to the  other  contracting  party  or parties  which  it considers  to be
concerned.  Any  contracting  party  thus  approached  shall  give sympathetic
consideration  to the  representations  or proposals  made  to it."  (XXIII:1).
We will  return  to the  consideration  of serious  prejudice  and
nullification  or impairment  following  a review  of various  aspects  of
countervailing  action. These  aspects  are  the  measurement  of subsidy,  the
determination  of injury,  the  definition  of  domestic  industry,  cumulative
injury  assessment,  the  application  of the  de  minimis  clause  and 'nuisance'
countervailing  actions.- 12  -
The  Measurement  of Subsidy
The  General  Agreement  limits  countervailing  duties  to "the  estimated
bounty  or subsidy  determined  to  have  been  granted"  (VI:3). This  provision  has
been  reconfirmed  and  extended  by the  Code: "No  countervailing  duty  shall  be
levied  on  any imported  product  in  excess  of the  amount  of subsidy  found  to
exist,  calculated  in terms  of subsidization  per  unit  of the  subsidized  and
exported  product"  (4:2). The  General  Agreement  does  not  deal  with the  ir.ue
of measurement,  however,  and  the  Code  is limited  to the  statement  that  "an
understanding  among  signatories  should  be developed  setting  out  the  criteria
for  the  calculation  of the  amounL  of subsidy"  (4:2,  footnote  15).
A controversy  has  arisen  as to  whether  the  amount  of subsidy  should
be determined  on the  basis  of the  cost  to the  government  or benefit  to  the
recipient. The  former  position  appears  to  be supported  by the  fact  that,
according  to the  provision  just  cited,  a countervailing  duty  may  not  exceed
"the  estimated  bounty  or subsidy  determined  to  have  been  granted"  (VI:3). In
turn,  the  Code's  provision  that  "no  countervailing  duty  shall  be levied  on any
imported  product  in  excess  of the  amount  of subsidy  found  to exist"  (4:2)  has
been  interpreted  to be  consistent  with  the  subsidy  being  equal  to the  benefit
received  by the  producer  or exporter.
From  the  economic  point  of view,  the  subsidy  should  be  measured  in
terms  of the  benefit  to the  recipient.  As a practical  matter,  this  will
usually  be gauged  in terms  of the  cost  to the  government.  An important
exception  was  noted  above:  in  cases  when  banks  provide  a subsidized  credit
against  which  there  are lower  reserve  requirements,  the  interest  preference
should  be calculated  relative  to  generally-applicable  interest  rates.- 13  -
Under  Article  XVI  of the  General  Agreement,  it is  the  responsibility
of the  country  granting  the  subsidy  to indicate  the  extent  of subsidization  in
notifying  GATT  of the  existence  of a subsidy. In taking  countervailing
action,  then,  the  importing  country  may  consider  the  estimate  made in  the
notification  to GATT  as a point  of departure  in setting  countervailing  duties.
The  proposed  procedure  would  reduce  uncertainty  as to the  measurement
of the  subsidy  for  purposes  of  countervailing  action. It  would  also  provide
inducement  to  countries  imposing  subsidies  to  notify  GATT  on the  extent  of
subsidization.
It is  further  proposed  that,  in  the  event  countervailing  duties  are
set  at  a level  higher  than  the  subsidy  notified  to the  Contracting  Parties,
the  country  granting  the  subsidy  should  have  the  right  to ask  for
consultation,  conciliation,  and  dispute  settlement  in  GATT. This  would  reduce
existing  complaints  concerning  countervailing  action.
The  Determination  of Injury
The  General  Agreement  speaks  of  material  injury  without  giving  a
definition. In turn,  the  Code  provides  that  "a  determination  of injury  for
purposes  of Article  VI of the  General  Agreement  shall  involve  an objective
examination  of both (a)  the  volume  of subsidized  imports  and  their  effect  on
the  prices  in the  domestic  market  for  like  products  and  (b)  the  consequent
impact  of these  imports  on domestic  producers  of such  products"  (6:1). It is
further  stated:
With  regard  to  volume  of subsidized  imports  the  investigating
authorities  shall  consider  whether  there  has  been  a significant
increase  in  subsidized  imports,  either  in  absolute  terms  or relative
to production  or consumption  in  the  importing  signatory.  With  regard
to the  effect  of the  subsidized  imports  on prices,  the  investigating
authorities  shall  consider  whether  there  has  been  a significant  price
undercutting  by the  subsidized  imports  as compared  with  the  price  of- 14  -
a like  product  of the  importing  signatory,  or  whether  the  effect  of
such  imports  is  otherwise  to  depress  prices  to a significant  degree
or prevent  price  increases,  which  otherwise  would  have  occurred,  to  a
significant  degree. No one  or several  of these  factors  can
necessarily  give  decisive  guidance"  (6:2).
"The  examination  of the  impact  on the  domestic  industry
concerned  shall  include  an evaluation  of all  relevant  economic
factors  and indices  having  bearing  on the  state  of the  industry  such
as actual  and  potential  decline  in  output,  sales,  market  share,
profits,  productivity,  return  on investments,  or utilization  of
capacity;  factors  affecting  domestic  prices;  actual  and  potential
negative  effects  on  cash  flow,  inventories,  employment,  wages,
growth,  ability  to  raise  capital  or investment  and,  in the  case  of
agriculture,  whether  there  has  been  an increased  burden  on  Government
support  programmes.  This  list  is  not  exhaustive,  nor  can  one  or
several  of these  factors  necessarily  give  decisive  guidance"  (6:3).
We thus  have  a series  of criteria  and  while  the  effect  on prices  is
given  pride  of place  in  Article  6:1,  in  Article  6:3  this  is  only  one  of
several  criteria. At the  same  time,  from  the  economic  point  of view,  emphasis
should  be given  to  profits. Thus,  one  may  examine  the  extent  to  which
subsidies  have  led  to  reductions  in profits  in  the  affected  industry  below
what  may  be considered  normal  profits. In so  doing,  adjustment  would  need to
be  made for  changes  in  business  conditions.
The  question  remains  what  is  meant  by material  injury  in the  General
Agreement. While  this  concept  is  not  elucidated  in the  Code,  material  injury
should  be interpreted  to  mean substantial  injury. Countervailing  action  would
not be  appropriate  in  the  event  that  a subsidy  has  small  and  negligible
effects. Thus,  a substantial  decline  in profits  attributed  to the  subsidy
would  be considered  an indication  of  material  injury.
The  Definition  of Domestic  Industry
According  to  the  Code,  "In  determining  injury,  the  term  'domestic
industry'  shall,  except  as provided  in paragraph  7 below,  be interpreted  as- 15  -
referring  to the  domestic  producers  as a  whole  of the  like  products  or to
those  of them  whose  collective  output  of the  products  constitutes  a major
proportion  of the  total  domestic  production  of those  products  ...  (6:5). The
exception  refers  to  the  case  when  "the  territory  of a signatory  may, for  the
production  in  question,  be  divided  into  two  or  more  competitive  markets  and
the  producers  within  each  market  may  be regarded  as a separate  industry  ... "
(6:7).
It is further  stated  that  "the  term 'like  product'  ('produit
similaire')  shall  be interpreted  to  mean a product  which  is identical,  i.e.
alike  in  all  respects  to the  product  under  consideration  or in  the  absence  of
such  a product,  another  product  which  although  not  alike  in  all  respects,  has
characteristics  closely  resembling  those  of the  product  under  consideration"
(6:1,  note 18). These  provisions  may  be utilized  in dealing  with  the
controversies  that  have  arisen  in  regard  to the  meaning  of  like  products  for
raw  agricultural  products  and for  parts  and  components.
While  it  has  been  suggested  that  raw  agricultural  products  be
included  with processed  primary  products  in  respect  to  countervailing  action,
this  would  conflict  with  the  definition  of industry  in the  Code.  In fact,
rather  than  being  like  products,  raw  agricultural  products  and  processed
primary  products  represent  different  levels  of transformation.
Similar  considerations  apply  to  parts  and  components.  Rather  than
being  like  products,  parts  and  components  materially  differ  from  the  assembled
product. They  should  not  be included  therefore  in  the  same  industry  as
defined  by the  Code.
A further  issue  that  has  arisen  in  regard  to the  definition  of
domestic  industry  is the  representativeness  of the  petitioners  who  request- 16  -
countervailing  action. The  Code  refers  "to  the  domestic  producers  as a whole
of the  like  products  or to  those  of them  whose  collective  output  of the
products  constitutes  a major  proportion  of the  total  domestic  production  of
those  products  ..." (6:5). This  may be  understood  to  mean  that  requests
should  be acted  upon  if they  are  supported  by a  majority  of producers,  defined
in terms  of output  value.
Cumulative  Injury  Assessment
The  term  "cumulative  injury  assessment"  refers  to the  practice  of
defining  material  injury  with  respect  to the  combined  effects  of subsidized
imports  from  all  countries  concerned. The  cumulative  assessment  of injury
increases  the  likelihood  of affirmative  findings,  compared  with  the  situation
when injury  is  determined  with  respect  to  each  exporting  country,  taken
separately.
Neither  the  General  Agreement  nor  the  Code  deals  with  cumulative
injury  assessment.  And  while  references  to the  volume  of subsidized  imports
in the  Code (6:1)  may  be interpreted  to refer  to  the  cumulative  assessment  of
injury,  the  opposite  conclusion  may  be reached  on the  basis  of  a passage
concerning  the  imposition  of ccuntervailing  duty: "When  the  countervailing
duty is  imposed  in  respect  of any  product,  such  countervailing  duty  shall  be
levied,  in  the  appropriate  amounts,  on  a nondiscriminatory  basis  on imports  of
such  product  from  all  sources  found  to  be subsidized  and  to  be causing  injury
..."  (4:3).
Nevertheless,  from  the  economic  point  of  view,  cumulative  injury
assessment  is  a sensible  procedure  since,  for  the  domestic  industry,  it is  the
combined  effect  of foreign  subsidies  that  matters. As long  as there  is- 17 -
material  injury  that  can  be  attributed  to subsidization  by foreign  exporting
countries,  there  is justification  for  countervailing  action.
The  question  remains,  however,  if  countervailing  action  should  be
taken  against  all subsidizing  countries  or only  against  some  of them  if they,
combined,  give  rise  to  material  injury. The  answer  is simple  if the  exporters
are  of  equal  size  and  provide  subsidies  of similar  magnitude: countervailing
action  should  be taken  against  all  exporters  in  this  case.
The  situation  is  more  complicated  if  exports  vary  in  size  and  the
magnitude  of the  subsidies  differ. Now,  it  would  be inappropriate  to levy
countervailing  duties  on the  exports  of countries  that  did  not  contribute  to
material  injury. This,  in turn,  necessitates  examining  the  possible  effects
of omitting  individual  countries  from  the  calculation  and  taking
countervailing  action  only  against  those  that  contributed  to  the  material
injury.
De Minimis  Subsidy
Material  injury  could  not  be caused  if  subsidies  are  "de  minimis,"
i.e.  they  are  very  small. This  is  because,  if  the  subsidy  is  de  minimis,  it
can  be assumed  that  no material  injury  exists. The  application  of such  a
procedure  conforms  to  Article  2:12  of the  Code,  according  to  which  "an
investigation  will  be terminated  when  the  investigating  authorities  are
satisfied  that  no subsidy  exists  or that  the  effects  of the  alleged  subsidy  on
the  industry  is  not  such  as to cause  injury."
It  has  been suggested  that  a general  definition  of de minimis  subsidy
is  not  possible  because  of  differences  in  factors  such  as the  size  of  exports
and  their  price  sensitivity.  Nevertheless,  one  may  establish  a floor  in  terms
of subsidy  rates  which  involves  the  presumption  that  no material  injury- 18  -
exists. While  the  choice  is  to a considerable  extent  arbitrary,  it  may  be
assumed  that  a subsidy  rate  below  1  percent  does  not  cause  material  injury.
Nuisance  Countervailing  Actions
The  application  of the  de  minimis  rule  would  limit  "nuisance"
countervailing  actions  that  aim  at  discouraging  exports. The  question  arises
if other  measures  may  also  be taken  to  avoid  such  actions.
One  possibility  is  to impose  a penalty  in  the  case  when
countervailing  action  was initiated  even  though  no appropriate  basis
existed. Another  would  be to strengthen  the  preliminary  review  process  before
the  claim  is  acted  upon  by the  authorities  of the  importing  country.
Serious  Prejudice  and  Nullification  or Impairment
Thus  far,  the  discussion  concerned  countervailing  action  against
subsidies  that  cause  material  injury  in the  importing  country. As noted
earlier,  injury  may  also  result  when  the  foreign  subsidy  adversely  affects  a
country's  sales  to  third  markets  or to  the  markets  of the  country  imposing  the
subsidy. In these  cases,  Articles  XVI  and  XXIII  may  apply  as noted  above.
Articles  XVI  and  XXIII  are  very  weak  provisions.  Not  only  is there
no obligation  to  withdraw  subsidization  but  the  GATT  procedures  for  dispute
settlement  do not  come  into  play.
Dispute  settlement  procedures  were  introduced  in the  Code. These
would  follow  consultations  concerning  the  subsidy:
"Whenever  a signatory  has  reason  to  believe  that  any  subsidy  is  being
granted  or maintained  by  another  signatory  and  that  such  subsidy
either  causes  injury  to  its  domestic  industry,  nullification  or
impairment  of benefits  accruing  to it  under  the  General  Agreement,  or
serious  prejudice  to its  interests,  such  signatory  may  request
consultations  with such  other  signatory  (12:3).
"If,  in  the  case  of consultations  under  paragraph  3  of Article  12,  a
mutually  acceptable  solution  has  not  been  reached  within  sixty  days- i9  -
of the  request  for  consultations,  any  signatory  party  to such
consultations  may refer  the  matter  to the  Committee  for  conciliation
in  accordance  with the  provisions  of Part  VI" (13:2).
"If  any  dispute  arising  under  this  Agreement  is  not  resolved  as a
result  of consultations  or conciliations,  the  Committee  shall,  upon
request,  review  the  matter  in  accordance  with the  dispute  settlement
procedures  of Part  VI" (13:3).
"If,  as a result  of its  review,  the  Committee  concludes  that  an
export  subsidy  is  being  granted  in  a manner  inconsistent  with  the
provisions  of this  Agreement  or that  a subsidy  is  being  granted  or
maintained  in  such  a manner  as to cause  injury,  nullification  or
impairment,  or serious  prejudice,  it shall  make such  recommendations
to the  parties  as  may  be appropriatc  to resolve  the  issue  and,  in the
event  the  recommendations  are  not  followed,  it  may  authorize  such
countermeasures  as  may  be appropriate,  taking  into  account  the  degree
and  nature  of the  adverse  effects  found  to  exist,  in  accordance  with
the  relevant  provisions  of Part  VI." (13:4).
While  the  provisions  of Article  12  and 13  of the  Code  introduce
conciliation  and  dispute  settlement  procedures  in  the  event  of serious
prejudice  and  nullification  or impairment,  experience  indicates  that  these
procedures  are  not  always  effective.  Thua,  there  have  been  cases  when  the
Committee  on Subsidies  and  Countervailing  Measures  did  not  act  on a panel
report  (as  in the  pasta  case)  or one  of the  parties  involved  refused  to  accept
the  recommendations  (as  it  occurred  in a  case  where  the  United States  and
another  where  the  EC was  found  to have  violated  the  General  Agreement).
Correspondingly,  it  would  be  desirable  to strengthen  the  rules  on subsidies.
This  may  be done  by taking  the  EC rules  as a point  of  departure.
The  EC severely  limits  domestic  industrial  subsidies  in  order  to
avoid  distorting  competition  in  the  member  countries. It  would  be appropriate
to establish  rules  limi.ting  domestic  subsidies  in  GATT  as  well,  so  as to
minimize  distortions  in export  markets  and in  domestic  markets. This  could  be- 20  -
accomplished  by prohibiting  domestic  subsidies  that  exceed  a certain
percentage,  say  5 percent,  of output  value.
It may  be  added  that  domestic  subsidies  can  be used  as disguised
export  subsidies.  This  will  be the  case  when  exports  account  for  a large
proportion  of domestic  production.  One  may, then,  extend  the  prohibition  of
export  subsidies  in cases  when  exports  account  for,  say,  over  50 percent  of
domestic  output  to  domestic  subsidies  as  well.
Dispute  Settlement
The  proposed  extension  of the  prohibition  of export  subsidies  to
domestic  subsidies  meeting  certain  criteria  would  still  leave  a broad  range  of
domestic  subsidies.  And  while  specific  domestic  subsidies  are
countervailable,  as noted  earlier  there  is  no possibility  for  countervailing
action  if the  subsidies  affect  exports  to third  countries  or to  the  subsidy-
imposing  country's  own  markets.
It follows  that  there  is  need to improve  GATT  mechanisms  to  deal  with
cases  of serious  prejudice  and  nullification  or impairment.  This  would
necessitate  improving  the  existing  GATT  dispute  settlement  procedure.  Such
improvements  are  also  necessary  if  we consider  that  other  contentious  issues
may  arise  in  the  application  of Articles  VI and  XVI.
Particular  importance  attaches  to timeliness  in decision  making  and
in implementation.  A ruling  by a panel  should  be made  by  a specified  date  and
the  party  found  to  have  violated  the  General  Agreement  should  have  a specific
time  to  object  to the  ruling. Once  the  ruling  becomes  final,  it  should  be
carried  out  within  a short  period  and  it should  not  be subject  to blocking  by
the  party  who  has  been  found  to  have  violated  the  Agreement.- 21  -
The developed  countries  have  a particular  responsibility  to abide  by
panel  rulings. In this  regard,there  are  some  hopeful  signs,  e.g.  Japan
accepted  the  ruling  on abolishing  restrictions  on the  imports  of 12
foodstuffs.  There  has  also  been  an increase  in  the  number  of trade  disputes
brought  to  CATT  and  dispute  settlement  panels  have  speeded  up their  work.
III. Special  Treatment  of Developing  Countries
GATT  Rules  on Subsidies  by  Developing  Countries
Developing  countries  did  not  subscribe  to  Article  XVI:4  of the
General  Agreement  that  prohibits  the  use  of  export  subsidies  on products  other
than  primary  products. Article  14  of the  Code  further  notes: "Signatories
recognize  that  subsidies  are  an integral  part  of economic  development
programmes  of developing  countries"  (14:1). "Accordingly,  this  Agreement
shall  not  prevent  developing  country  signatories  from  adopting  measures  and
policies  to assist  their  industries,  including  those  in  the  export  sector"
(14:2).
At the  same  time,  "developing  country  signatories  agree  that  export
subsidies  on their  industrial  products  shall  not  be  used  in a  manner  which
causes  serious  prejudice  to the  trade  or pr;odoction  of another  signatory"
(14:3). However,  "there  shall  be no presumption  that  export  subsidies  granted
by developing  country  signatories  result  in  adverse  effects,  as defined  in
this  Agreement,  to the  trade  and  production  of another  signatory. Such
adverse  effects  shall  be demonstrated  by  positive  evidence,  through  an
economic  examination  of the  impact  on trade  or production  of  another
signatory"  (14:4).
These  provisions  conform  to  CATT  rules  establishing  special  and
differential  treatment  for  developing  countries.  Thus,  Article  XVIII  added  in- 22  -
1955  recognizes  that  it  may  be necessary  for  developing  countries  "to  take
protective  or other  measures  affecting  imports"  (XVIII:2)  and  "to  grant  the
governmental  assistance  required  to promote  the  establishment  of particular
industries"  (XVIII:3). Furthermore,  Article  XXXVI,  added  in 1965,  takes  note
of the  need  "for  a rapid  and sustained  expansion  of the  export  earnings  of the
less-developed  contracting  parties"  (XXXVI:2),  and  "for  positive  efforts
designed  to ensure  that  less-developed  contracting  parties  secure  a share  in
the  growth  in  international  trade  commensurate  with  the  needs  of their
economic  development"  (XXXVI:3).  Also,  it is stated  that  "the  developed
contracting  parties  shall  ...  have special  regard  to the  trade  interests  of
less-developed  contracting  parties  when  considering  the  application  of other
measures  permitted  under  this  Agreement  to  meet  particular  problems  and  to
explore  all  possibilities  of constructive  remedies  before  applying  such
measures  where  they  would  affect  essential  interests  of those  contracting
parites"  (XXXVII:3).
As noted  in  a  note  of the  GATT  Secretariat  ("Incentives  to Industrial
Exports  from  Developing  Countres,  COM/TD/72,  March  17,  1970  Para.  7) "it  is
clear  from  the  drafting  history  of Part  IV (of  the  General  Agreement]  that
countervailing  duties  are  among  the  measures  permitted  to  meet  particular
problems"  referred  to in  Article  XXXVII:3. It  does  not  appear,  however,  that
the  developed  countries  would  have  given  preferential  treatment  to developing
countries  in  the  application  of  countervailing  duties.
Optimal  Policies  for  Developing  Countries
On economic  grounds,  deviations  from  free  trade  can  be justified  on
the  grounds  of externalities  in production.  In  developing  countries,
externalities  may  involve  the  creation  of  new skills  as well  as technological- 23  -
improvements,  the  benefits  of which  are  not  fully  captured  by the  firm.  Such
externalities  exist  in  the  manufacturing  sector  of the  developing  countries,
although  their  magnitude  should  not  be  overstated.  Thus,  they  warrant
preferential  treatment  of this  sector  to  a limited  extent  only.
Ideally,  preferential  treatment  to  manufacturing  activities  should  be
provided  by production  subsidies  that  provide  the  same  incentive  to sales  in
domestic  and  in foreign  markets  and  do  not  distort  the  pattern  of
consumption.  By  contrast,  tariffs  discriminate  against  exports  and in  favor
of import  substitution  and  distort  the  pattern  of consumption  by raising  the
prices  of manufactured  goods.
Production  subsidies  are  not  practicable  in  most  developing  countries
because  of their  limited  capacity  to pay  taxes  which  would  finance  the
subsidies. Rather,  developing  countries  rely  largely  on import  tariffs  that
constitute  government  revenue.
The  application  of import  tariffs  and  export  subsidies  at equal  rates
has  advantages  over  reliance  on import  tariffs  alone. Under  this  alternative,
the  same  increase  in  domestic  production  can  be attained  at lower  tariffs  and
there  is  no discrimination  against  exports. And  although  consumption  is
distorted,  the  revenue  needs  of  export  subsidies  are  less  than  those  of
production  subsidies.
Steps  toward  the  equalization  of incentives  to import  substitution
and  exports  may  be taken  by a  devaluation  accompanied  by reductions  in import
duties. The  devaluation  would  provide  incentives  to  exports  while  import
protection  would  be reduced  to the  extent  that  reductions  in  tariffs  exceeded
the  rate  of devaluation.  For  example,  a 10  percent  devaluation  accompanied  by
a 20 percent  reduction  in  tariffs  would  lower  import  protection  by 10  percent- 24 -
and  increase  incentives  to  exports  by 10  percent. This is  because  a 10
percent  devaluation  is equivalent  to  a 10  percent  import  tariff  cum  export
subsidy.
The  described  procedure  would  reduce  but  not  eliminate  the  bias  of
the  incentive  system  against  exports. In  order  to further  reduce  this  bias,
developing  countries  should  make  use  of the  rules  provided  by GATT  to rebate
import  duties  on imported  inputs  and  indirect  taxes  on  all inputs  used  in
export  production,  extending  these  rebates  to indirect  inputs.
Rebating  duties  and indirect  taxes,  used  to  good  effect  by the  East
Asian  NICs,  would  put  the  export  sector  on a free  trade  footing. Extending
the  rebates  to indirect  inputs  is  especially  important,  both  to  reduce  the
cost  of exports  and  to  ensure  the  backward  integration  of the  production
process  through  the  domestic  production  of inputs  for  exports.
Developing  countries  may  also  provide  preferential  credit  to exports
to the  extent  allowed  by the  OECD  agreement  on official  export  credits,
referred  to in  the  illustrative  list  of export  subsidies  and  give  preference
to exporters  in  the  event  credit  is  rationed. Export  insurance  schemes  can
further  be set  up in the  absence  of the  private  provision  of such  insurance.
And, exports  can  be  assisted  through  investment  in infrastructure,  from  the
building  of ports  complemented  by access  roads  and  railway  connections  to the
establishment  of a  modern  telephone  system.
Covernmental  and  paragovernmental  organizations  may  further  use
measures  of export  promotion. Such  promotional  measures  include  the
organization  of trade  fairs  and  trade  missions,  the  collection  of informatiod
on  market  possibilities  for  export,  the  establishment  of trade  centers  and  of
consular  services  to promote  exports,  as  well  as quality  control.- 25  -
Beyond  these  measures,  export  subsidies  may  be provided  in cases  when
countervailing  action  does  not  threaten. This  will  be the  case  for  exporters
that  do  not cause  injury  to  developed  country  industries,  including  small
countries  as well  as the  exports  of large  countries  that  account  for  a small
proportion  of  developed  country  markets.
The  Graduation  Clause
As developing  countries  industrialize,  the  importance  of production
externalities,  and  hence  the  need  for  the  preferential  treatment  of the
manufacturing  sector,  will  decline. Correspondingly,  these  countries  may
reduce  reliance  on import  tariffs  and  export  subsidies. Eventually,
developing  countries  may forego  the  use  of export  subsidies  and  accept  GATT
rules  on the  prohibition  of these  subsidies.
The  described  situation  is  foreshadowed  in the  Code,  according  to
which  "a  developing  country  signatory  should  endeavor  to enter  into  a
commitment  to reduce  or e. minate  export  subsidies  when  the  use  of such  export
subsidies  is inconsistent  with  its  competitive  and  development  needs"
(14:5). The  Code  does  not  provide,  however,  for  a procedure  that  would  ensure
graduation  as developing  countries  industrialize.
Yet, it  would  be desirable  to  establish  a procedure  to  deal  with the
case  of  advanced  developing  countries  as  well  as with  the  case  when  an
industry  of a developing  country  is internationally  competitive.  This
procedure  may take  the  form  of the  application  of the  dispute  settlement
procedure  in  GATT,  involving  rulings  by  a panel  on complaints  submitted  to
GATT.- 26 -
IV.  Conclusions
This  paper  has  examined  issues  relating  to subsidies  and
countervailing  measures  and  made  recommendations  for  changes  in  existing  rules
on the  basis  of economic  considerations.  This  has  been  done in  regard  to
subsidies;  countervailing  measures  and  serious  prejudice,  nullification  or
impairment;  and  the  special  treatment  of developing  countries.
It is  suggested  that  the  illustrative  list  of  export  subsidies  be
made  definitive,  following  appropriate  revisions. These  revisions  would
eliminate  the  dual  pricing  of inputs  ard  remove  the  requirement  of the
physical  incorporation  of inputs  for  the  exemption  and  remission  of indirect
taxes  and import  charges. At the  same  time,  the  exception  made  for  primary
products  in  regard  to the  prohibition  of  export  subsidies  should  be  eliminated
over  time.
Only  measures  which  are  specific  to  an enterprise  or industry  or
group  of enterprises  or industries  should  be  considered  domestic  subsidies
from  the  point  of view  of the  application  of  Article  XVI  of the  Agreement.
This  rule  should  also  be  applied  to  regional  subsidies  and  to subsidies
provided  to inputs.
Both  export  subsidies  and  domestic  subsidies  are  countervailable  if
they  cause  or threaten  material  injury  to  an established  industry  or
materially  retard  the  establishment  of a  domestic  industry  of an importing
country. In this  connection,  several  issues  arise.
First,  the  subsidy  should  be  measured  in  terms  of the  benefit  to the
recipient  and  reported  to  GATT  as part  of the  procedure  of notifying  the
existence  of a subsidy,  with  the  estimate  used  as a point  of departure  in
setting  countervailing  duties. Second,  material  injury  should  be interpreted- 27 -
to  mean substantial  injury  and  gauged  in terms  of changes  in  profits  attendant
on the  imposition  of the  subsidy. Third,  domestic  industry  should  be defined
to exclude  raw  agricultural  materials  for  processed  products  and  parts  and
componeuts  for  final  products. Fourth,  cumulative  injury  assessment  should  be
applied,  with  countervailing  action  foregone  in regard  to the  exports  of
countries  that  did  not  contribute  to the  material  injury. Fifth,  material
injury  should  be  assumed  not to  exist  if  the  subsidy  is  de  minimis. Sixth,
procedures  should  be adopted  that  reduce  the  chances  of initiating  nuisance
countervailing  action.
Countervailing  action  is  not  available  in  cases  when  a foreign
subsidy  adversely  affects  a country's  sales  to third  markets  or to  the  markets
of the  country  imposing  the  subsidy. In cases  when the  subsidy  causes  serious
prejudice  or  nullification  or impairment  of  benefits  that  would  otherwise
accrue  to  a country  under  the  General  Agreement,  there  are  only  weak
provisions  for  possible  rectification.
Correspondingly,  it  would  be desirable  to  strengthen  existing  rules
on subsidies.  This  could  be accomplished  by prohibiting  domestic  subsidies
that  exceed  a certain  percentage  of output  value  as well  as domestic  subsidies
provided  in  cases  where  exports  account  for  a large  proportion  of output. It
would  also  be necessary  to improve  the  existing  GATT  dispute  settlement
mechanism.
Developing  countries  receive  preferential  treatment  in  the
application  of GATT  rules  on subsidies.  They  are  exhorted,  however,  to  reduce
or eliminate  export  subsidies  which  are  inconsistent  with  their  competitive  or
development  needs. It is  suggested  that  the  procedures  be established  to deal
with  the  case  of  advanced  developing  countries  and  with  the  case  when  an
industry  of a developing  country  is  internationally  competitive.
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